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1.  
 
Abstract: This paper defends two related ideas: pure market and capitalist economies are different 
economic  societies;  neither  can  be  adequately  represented  by  theories  of  value  but  both  can  be 
accurately  distinguished  by  a  monetary  approach.  Within  the  framework  of  a  simple  modeling,  we 
propose a conceptual clarification in four points. Firstly, market and capitalist economies are instituted 
by a principle of social quantification: money as the unit of account. Secondly, both economies are set in 
motion  by  a  medium  of  circulation:  money  as  the  general  equivalent.  Thirdly,  pure  market  society 
homogeneity is based on generalized access to money as the vehicle of autonomous expense (the carrier 
of unilateral action), while capitalist society heterogeneity is based on direct access to money reserved 
only  to  entrepreneurs  and  closed  to  monetarily  dependent  wage  earners.  Fourthly,  if  independent 
workers (integrated in a social division of labor) can be seen as motivated by the individual pursuit of 
utility, capitalists (engaged in an objective logic of capital accumulation) are driven by the subjective 
desire for money.  
 
JEL classification: B00, D51, E42, P00.  
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1- Introduction: Theories of value misrepresent both pure market and capitalist economies.  
 
  The pure market economy
2 and the capitalist economy are two monetary economies: this vision 
is anything but new and can especially be traced to Marx and Keynes. While these ideas are not totally 
forgotten today, they are somewhat frozen in time for both ideological and epistemological reasons
3; 
and yet Keynes and Marx might not have been perfectly complete or absolutely consistent about these 
issues
4.  It  thus  makes  sense  to  suggest  some  clarification of  this vision  in  conceptual  terms  (which 
specific kinds of monetary economies are a pure market economy and a capitalist economy?) and to 
propose simple economic models or basic analytical representations of this vision, showing that these 
ideas can be expressed in the contemporary mainstream syntax. At the same time this paper accepts the 
prevailing syntax, it substitutes the dominant semantics with a monetary approach. Indeed, the view 
supported in this paper is deeply opposed to all theories of value, whose first gesture is to dismiss money 
as a superficial phenomenon and to impose real goods (and reified services) as the deep essence, the 
solid ground of the economic value.  
 
                                                            
1 A previous French version of this paper (“Les constituants monétaires du capitalisme”) was presented at the international 
conference dedicated to “Monetary Economic Analysis,” Université Pierre Mendès-France, Grenoble, April 15
th-16
th 2010. A 
developed English version of this paper was presented at The New School “Macro Seminar”, New York City, April 12
th 2011.  
2 The market economy considered here is substantially pure as it is completely made of market elements, while a capitalist 
economy is partly or impurely a market economy (at least because of the wage relation). It is also formally pure as it is here an 
abstract representation or a speculative model (we don’t wonder here if such a market economy ever existed in human history).  
3 The dominant free market vision denies the conception of the economic society as class organized and monetarily ruled. And 
contemporary mainstream economics does not focus a lot on old fashioned political economy debates about economic systems.  
4 The capitalist economy is undoubtedly monetary for Keynes, but he did not propose any distinction between a pure market 
economy  and  a  capitalist  one.  Marx  proposed  such  a  distinction,  but  the  specifications  he  gave  of  these  economies  are 
sometimes real (labor value and surplus value theories) and sometimes monetary, which raises some contradiction, so to speak.  2 
 
Even if our perspective is in some way inspired by Marxian monetary analyses and by Keynesian 
circuit  representations,  this  conceptual  and  analytical  text  is  not,  properly  speaking,  a  history  of 
economic thought paper: Marx and Keynes, among others, are not here reviewed but referred to as 
benchmarks. We will actually rely on four landmarks. We will refer to Walras for a real economy made of 
homogeneous agents [North-West] and to Ricardo for a real economy made of heterogeneous agents 
[South-West]. And we will refer to Smith (about the economy of primitive times) or to Marx I (about 
simple market production) for the monetary pure market economy [North-East] and to Keynes or to 
Marx II (about capitalist production) for the monetary capitalist economy [South-East]. Such a general 
map derives from the crossing of two independent major distinctions: one is about the type of economic 
society  (made of  symmetrical  or  asymmetrical  agents)  and  the  other  is  about  the  social  objectivity 
(money or the list of goods) grounding economic evaluations.  
 
  The opposition between a pure market economy [North] and a capitalist economy [South] can be 
found in Smith and Marx. Walras only deals with a symmetrical economy, while Ricardo and Keynes are 
only concerned by asymmetrical economies. A pure market economy rests on the homogeneity of free 
and equal economic agents, who trade commodities through prices; and a capitalist economy is based 
on  the  heterogeneity of economic  agents,  capitalists  exerting  economic  initiative and  wage earners 
acting in a subordinate capacity. Prices are the only economic media in a pure market economy, while 
wage is not a price like any other in a capitalist economy. 
 
  The opposition between a real economy [West] and a monetary economy [East] runs in political 
economy, as pointed out by Schumpeter [1954]
5. Benetti and Cartelier [1980] developed this two-term 
alternative  confronting  theories  of  value  and  monetary  approaches  as  two  opposite  basic  ways  to 
conceive the social objectivity grounding economic valuations. On one hand, theories of values are based 
on  a  “nomenclature  of  goods  postulate”  which  socially  defines  the  list  of  recognized  commodities. 
Consequently,  the  major  duty  of  this  economics  is  to  determine  relative  prices,  whatever  their 
expression in an indifferent numéraire. Money may secondarily be introduced as a convenient economic 
tool (to store value and to facilitate exchange), so the minor duty of this economics is to determine the 
real value of money and to establish its neutrality. On the other hand, monetary approaches are based 
on a “monetary postulate” which socially defines the unit of account and the rules of monetary creation, 
circulation and destruction. Consequently, all economic evaluations are primarily absolute and the basic 
economic  variables  to  be  explained  are  monetary  flows  or  payments.  As  monetary  counterparts, 
commodities may be recognized by their monetary exchangeability; and consistently their basic values 
have to be determined as monetary prices.  
 
  WEST : 






or equal  
economic functions 
Walrasian economy 
Real model of “market” exchange,  
but description of an  
individualistic planned economy  
(non-collectivist socialism) 
Pure market monetary economy 
Monetary model of market exchange,  
and description of a  
social division of labor economy  




or hierarchical  
economic functions  
Ricardian economy 
Real model of “capitalist” production,  
but description of a  
real exploitation economy 
(a feudal economy) 
Keynesian economy 
Monetary model of capitalist production, 
and description of a  
monetary exploitation economy  
(a capitalist economy)  
                                                            
5 See “Value and Money” (Chapter 6, Part II of Schumpeter’s “History of Economic Analysis”).  3 
 
 
Our starting point should be Walrasian [North-West], because this benchmark economy enables 
us to maintain a substantive contact with mainstream economics and because this neoclassical economy 
enables  us  to  consider  monetary  economies  from  a  distance  (so  the  introduction  of  all  monetary 
features will be explicit). The Walrasian camp has to be leaved because it might be considered as neither 
market nor capitalist. First, if the Walrasian pure exchange economy model describes an individualistic 
economy which is indeed homogeneous, it does not really display a market economy, as independant 
initiative is controlled by a central institution: individual intentions have to be socially ratified before 
being executed (no disequilibrium trading). The economy à la Walras is neither a command economy, as 
the economic decisions are made by the individuals and not by the Plan, nor a market economy, as the 
general consistency of all individual decisions has to be socially checked before economic action can take 
place: this mixed economy finally appears as some specific kind of individualistic planning
6. Second, and 
more obviously, the Walrasian internal development from pure exchange to production and then to 
capitalization
7 misses what is here assumed to be a major and salient feature of capitalism: the relatively 
strong asymmetric relation between employers and employees.  
 
A move toward the Ricardian world [South-West] may be possible, as this classical vision of the 
economic society is definitely asymmetric, so it could appear as a relevant representation of a capitalist 
economy
8. But we won’t carry on with this idea, as the real version of capitalist asymmetry is less 
appropriate than its monetary version. If the neoclassical vision upgrades the wage earner as if she/he 
were the equal of the capitalist entrepreneur (which denies the fact that the former obeys the latter 
inside  the  company),  the  classical  vision  downgrades  the  employee  as  a  slave  or  an  input  for  the 
employer (which denies the fact that the former is able to freely spend her/his revenue). In other words, 
the subtlety of the wage earner condition is missed by the too symmetrical neoclassical view and the too 
asymmetrical classical view. Conceiving the wage relation as a monetary dependence might appear as 
more balanced. Positively, as Ricardian political economy displays a very strong asymmetry between 
“masters and servants” and carries a non-monetary vision of exploitation (a physical part of the products 
of labor being taken by the lords and the priests), it could in some way represent a feudal economy.  
 
Neglecting the move from Walras to Ricardo, we will first jump from a real exchange economy 
[North-West] to a monetary pure market economy [North-East]. The first model displays a Walrasian 
pure  exchange  economy,  but  specialized  productions  (and  so  independent  workers)  are  implicitly 
present, as the initial endowments are assumed to be unimodal. It exemplifies a real exchange economy 
without dedicated markets, as bread and wine are directly traded (by two bakers and two wine-sellers 
and at a relative price). Individual disequilibria are excluded (as an expulsion of market sanction) and 
exchange only takes place when the equilibrium price is found. The second model introduces money as 
the unit of account, as the general equivalent and as the generalized vehicle of autonomous expense. It 
illustrates a monetary economy of dedicated markets, as each commodity is traded for money on its 
proper market  at some absolute price. Effective individual disequilibria  appear (as an expression of 
market sanction) as soon as market prices (prices shaped by actions) differ from calculus prices (prices 
shaping decisions), on the basis of a certain rule of price formation.  
 
                                                            
6 This echoes the project of a synthesis between free market and socialism (libéralisme et socialisme) Walras wanted to achieve.  
7 On the Walrasian analytical development (from exchange to production and then capitalization and money), see for example 
Rebeyrol [1999] or Walker [2006].  
8 On the Ricardian vision of the capitalist economy (involving a class division), see for example Bidard et Klimovsky [2006] (page 
16) or Foley [2006] (pages 76 and 77).  4 
 
And we will then move from the monetary economy of markets [North-East] to the monetary 
capitalist economy [South-East]
9. In our third model, the economic society becomes a simple capitalist 
society as the ability to spend autonomously is restricted to capitalists only, wage-earners being defined 
by  their  monetary  dependence:  our  four  merchants  become  two  entrepreneurs  and  two  salaried 
employees. Capitalists determine the employment level and they “earn what they spend”. Wage earners 
supply the quantity of labor demanded by the entrepreneurs and they “spend what they earn”. Each 
salaried  employee  necessarily  respects  her/his  budget  constraint,  but  monetary  disequilibrium  is 
possible  for  any  capitalist,  who  controls  her/his  initial  expenses  but  radically  ignores  her/his  final 
incomes. In our fourth model, the simple capitalist economy becomes a bit more complex, as one of the 
consumption  goods  is  turned  into  an  investment  good,  triggering  the  profit-investment  dynamics. 
Capitalists still spend in consumption, but in investment too. So the pure logic of utility or the simple 
paradigm of needs (CMC’) is substituted with the ruling logic of capital accumulation (MCM’), which is 
driven by the desire for money.  
  
The central part of this paper consists in four variations on the theme of a same economic basis 
made of four agents (indexed a-b-c-d) and two commodities (indexed 1-2). To describe the effective 
economic relations involved in each model, we rely only on the quasi-matrix of bilateral physical flows 
for model I (equilibrium exchange) and mainly on the matrix of bilateral monetary flows for models II, III, 
IV  (disequilibrium  exchange).  Physical  flows  are  denoted  in  lower-case  letters  (consumption  c ; 
investment i ; employee work t) and monetary flows in upper-case letters (consumption expenses C ; 
investment expenses I ; wages W). Reflexive flows (consumption and investment) are denoted with a 
prime.  Appendices  provide  the  exhaustive  determination  of  models  or  the  full  explanation  of  the 
formation of economic variables. Expected variables are identified by italics.  
 
  We  put  forward  the  transfer  matrices  to  emphasize  the  effective  emergence  of  subjective 
positions  through  the  operation  of  intersubjective  relations,  a  methodological  point  that  will  be 
developed  in  the  conclusion.  And  these  matrices  are  a  very  convenient  way  to  record  effective 
exchanges and to report the formation of individual situations. For decentralized monetary economies, 
payment  matrices  display  the  general  network  of  monetary  relations:  they  clearly  describe  how  i 
contributes to determine j’s position (some of i’s spendings making part of j’s receipts if i buys something 
from j) and reversely how j contributes to determine i’s position (some of i’s receipts being made by part 
of j’s spendings if i sells something to j). In the body of the text, we present the transfer matrices and 
develop  the  macroeconomic  identities  (Walras’  law)  and  causalities  (Kaldor-Kalecki  principle)  they 
involve. We complete the models in the appendices, making explicit the expectation schemes backing 
the decisions and the modes of market price formation taking place in the general structure of the 










                                                            
9 This way to introduce first money and then wage relation is different from the approach chosen by Van de Velde [2005], who 
also starts with Walras [North-West] and ends with Keynes [South-East] too, but goes through Ricardo [South-West].  5 
 
2- A real economy of exchange (Model I).  
 
Let’s consider a Walrasian pure exchange economy. If we adopt a unimodal profile for the initial 
endowments, a social division of labor is obtained (even if production remains implicit). This economic 
structure  is  animated  by  individuals  who  are  specialized  producers  and  “generalist  consumers.” 
Precisely, agents a and b hold good 1: they self-consume some of it and trade the other part of it for 
good 2. Likewise agents c and d own good 2: they eat some of it and exchange the remaining portion of 
it for good 1. Through a general barter, agent a jumps from the initial allocation (1 ; 0) to the equilibrium 
allocation (c’1a
e ; c2a
e), giving up some good 1 (to c and/or d) and getting some good 2 (from c and/or d).  
  
↗  a.  b.  c.  d.  ∑ (ini. alloc. Xh) 
a.  (c’1a
e ; 0)  (0 ; 0)  (c1c
e/2 ; 0)  (c1d
e/2 ; 0)  (1 ; 0)  
b.  (0 ; 0)   (c’1b
e ; 0)  (c1c
e/2; 0)  (c1d
e/2; 0)  (1 ; 0) 
c.  (0 ; c2a
e/2)  (0 ; c2b
e/2)  (0 ; c’2c
e)   (0 ; 0)  (0 ; 1) 
d.  (0 ; c2a
e/2)  (0 ; c2b
e/2)  (0 ; 0)   (0 ; c’2d
e)  (0 ; 1) 









e)  (2 ; 2) 
Quasi-matrix of bilateral real flows of model I: (good 1 ; good 2). 
 
  The determination of equilibrium and then the implementation of equilibrium exchanges are 
developed in appendix 1. Let’s quickly recall what could be called the Walrasian  tempo. During the 
tâtonnement, there is no disequilibrium trading: whatever the exchange process
10, (equilibrium) prices to 
be applied and quantities to be exchanged are predetermined when exchange begins. At each step of 
the preliminary tâtonnement, knowledge of the current price system ensures individual equilibrium. 
Every  emerging  general  disequilibrium  remains virtual  (as  it  is  socially  unvalidated)  but  if  a  general 
equilibrium appears, it is meant to become effective (as it is socially validated).  As the recontracting à la 
Edgeworth, the tâtonnement à la Walras displays some general hypothetical negotiation which stops 
when  a  general  agreement  (general  equilibrium  situation  or  absence  of  coalition  improvement)  is 
reached. Then and only then, as the set of potential exchanges has been ratified, can it be applied. From 
the neoclassical view, coordination operates through a pre-validation procedure of individual choices.  
 
  Two social identities prevail in this real equilibrium world. First, the volume identity is simply 
expressed by the previous quasi-matrix: ∑h Xh = ∑h Xh
e. It is a principle of material conservation of goods 
(the real economic matter) through exchange. This principle could be stated as the Lavoisier’s law of 
economic mass: nothing is lost (consumption will occur after), nothing is gained (production occurred 
before), everything is transformed (the ownership on goods is reorganized by exchange). Second, the 
value identity is Walras’ law, classically obtained from the necessary property of equilibrium for every 
budget constraint (P Zh = 0 for any h), an individual property conserved through aggregation (P Z = 0).  
 
  Analytically,  the  “nomenclature  of  goods  postulate”  grounds  the  objectivity  of  market 
evaluations. This principle displays three dimensions. Firstly, it is a postulate of real accounting: values 
are expressed in real terms. Secondly, it is a postulate of real exchange: goods are traded for goods. 
Thirdly,  it  is  a  postulate  of  real  equilibrium:  in  this  simultaneous  economy,  the  individuals’  budget 
positions are always balanced and the principle of exchange equivalence is necessarily respected.  
 
  There is nothing monetary in this homogeneous economy. Prices are expressed in a numéraire, 
but the selection of a standard of value does not matter: the “absence of money illusion” prevails.  
                                                            
10 See Ostroy and Starr [1974] about the different implementation procedures of competitive allocations.  6 
 
 
3- A “monetary economy of markets” (Model II).  
 
Keeping the same structure of social division of labor operated by homogeneous individuals, we 
substitute indirect monetary exchanges (on market for good 1 and on market for good 2) for direct 
barter (good 1 versus good 2).  
 
↗  a.  b.  c.  d.  ∑ (ini. alloc. Xh) 
a.  (c’1a ; 0)  (0 ; 0)  (c1c / 2 ; 0)  (c1d / 2 ; 0)  (1 ; 0)  
b.  (0 ; 0)   (c’1b ; 0)  (c1c / 2 ; 0)  (c1d / 2 ; 0)  (1 ; 0) 
c.  (0 ; c2a / 2)  (0 ; c2b / 2)  (0 ; c’2c)  (0 ; 0)  (0 ; 1) 
d.  (0 ; c2a / 2)  (0 ; c2b / 2)  (0 ; 0)   (0 ; c’2d)  (0 ; 1) 
∑ (final alloc. Xh)  (c’1a ; c2a)  (c’1b ; c2b)  (c1c ; c’2c)  (c1d ; c’2d)  (2 ; 2) 
Quasi-matrix of bilateral real flows of model II: (good 1 ; good 2). 
 
↗  a.  b.  c.  d.  ∑ (outgoings) 
a.  [C’1a]  0  C2a / 2  C2a / 2  Da 
b.  0  [C’1b]  C2b / 2  C2b / 2  Db 
c.  C1c / 2  C1c / 2  [C’2c]  0  Dc 
d.  C1d / 2  C1d / 2  0  [C’2d]  Dd 
∑ (incomings)  Ra  Rb  Rc  Rd  Ω 
Matrix of bilateral monetary flows of model II: in dollars. 
 
  The transition from the real quasi matrix to the monetary matrix is given by: Ckh = pk* ckh. For this 
equation to be explicit, the formation of the monetary price of good k must be explained. A specification 
is proposed in the appendix 2, using what Benetti and Cartelier [2001] call the “Cantillon Smith rule,” 
which states that the market price is formed as the ratio of two kinds of bid: the value demand on the 
volume supply
11. In such an economy, the tempo is not neoclassical, as price formation is embedded in 
effective monetary transactions (on each market dedicated to one good). The market sequence may 
typically be broken down into three phases. First, the market jump: suppliers bid quantities of goods (to 
sell) and demanders bid quantities of money (to buy). Second, a market price emerges from these 
economic actions, and this effective price may be different from the expected price. Third, the market 
sanction:  effective  sales  and  receipts  (for  suppliers)  and  effective  expenses  and  purchases  (for 
demanders) are determined: the final allocations and the monetary balance give the synthetic market 
result for each individual. Under this monetary view of the market sequence, coordination operates 
through a post-validation procedure of individual actions. 
 
  Two  social  identities  prevail  in  this  monetary  disequilibrium  world.  The  volume  identity 
(conservation of goods) still stands. The value identity (conservation of money) still comes from the 
aggregation of the effective budget constraints: the social monetary balance S = ∑h Sh = ∑h (Rh - Dh) = (∑h 
Rh) – (∑h Dh) = Ω - Ω = 0. This is the expression of Walras’ law in a monetary economy
12. Every expense 
(for one) being a receipt (for another) and vice versa, the sum of the monetary balances is nil: even if 
individual balances are positive or negative, they necessarily offset each other.  
 
                                                            
11 This rule can be found in classical political economy, in Keynes and in strategic market games à la Shapley-Shubik [1977] (in 
this latter case without exploiting the disequilibrium potential of this rule).  
12 See Julien et Tricou [2007], pages 92 and 93.   7 
 
  Analytically, the “monetary postulate” henceforth grounds the objectivity of market evaluations. 
This principle is three-faceted. Firstly, it is a postulate of monetary accounting: values are expressed in 
monetary  terms  (in  dollars  for  instance).  Secondly,  it  is  a  postulate  of  monetary  exchange:  in  this 
sequential  economy,  each  good  is  traded  for  dollars
13.  Thirdly,  it  is  a  postulate  of  monetary 
disequilibrium:  in  this  sequential  economy,  the  individuals’  effective  budget  positions  are  likely 
unbalanced, and this violation of the principle of exchange equivalence requires restoration through a 
“settling of scores” procedure. This post-market procedure of demonetization (money destruction) is 
indeed the closing moment where deficit are financed and surpluses are used, under the supervision of 
the Bank. It is the reverse side of the pre-market procedure of minting or monetization (money creation), 
which  is  the  opening  moment  where  a  purchasing  power  is  provided  by  the  Bank  to  autonomous 
spenders. The downstream recording of a monetary disequilibrium and the obtaining of an undesired 
allocation are possible (and even likely) because of the upstream launching of an autonomous monetary 
expenditure.  
 
This homogeneous economy is monetary, as money operates as a unit of account, a market 
general equivalent and a vehicle of autonomous expenditure (here for all individuals). And this pure 
market economy features independent workers or craftsmen who are “entrepreneurs” as they take a 





























                                                            
13 This echoes the Clower aphorism: “money buys goods and goods buy money, but goods do not buy goods”. 8 
 
4- A monetary economy of capitalist production without accumulation (Model III).  
 
The  monetary  economy  is  still  made  of  two  consumption  goods,  from  now  on  explicitly 
produced. Individuals a et c remain specialized entrepreneurs, but individuals b and d become wage 
earners: b works for a and d works for c. So there are now capitalist employers and salaried employees, 
all remaining generalist consumers.  
 
↗  a.  c.  b.  d.  ∑ 
a.  (c’1a ; 0 ; 0)  (c1c ; 0 ; 0)  (c1b ; 0 ; 0)  (c1d ; 0 ; 0)  (q1a ; 0 ; 0) 
c.  (0 ; c2a ; 0)  (0 ; c’2c ; 0)  (0 ; c2b ; 0)  (0 ; c2d ; 0)  (0 ; q2c ; 0) 
b.  (0 ; 0 ; t1b)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; t1b) 
d.  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; t2d)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; t2d) 
∑  (c’1a ; c2a ; t1b)  (c1c ; c’2c ; t2d)  (c1b ; c2b ; 0)  (c1d ; c2d ; 0)  (q1 ; q2 ; t) 
Quasi-matrix of bilateral real flows of model III: (good 1; good 2; labor). 
 
↗  a.  c.  b.  d.  ∑ 
a.  [C’1a]  C2a  W1b  0  Da  
c.  C1c  [C’2c]  0  W2d  Dc  
b.  C1b  C2b  0  0  Db 
d.  C1d  C2d  0  0  Dd 
∑  Ra  Rc  Rb  Rd  Ω 
Matrix of bilateral monetary flows of model III: in dollars. 
 
  The transition from the real quasi matrix to the monetary matrix is given by: Wkh = w0 tkh (where 
w0 is the exogenous nominal wage) and by Ckh = pk* ckh. The market price of good k may once more rely 
on the “Cantillon Smith rule,” as developed in appendix 3.  
 
In this world of monetary disequilibrium, the social identity of material conservation still stands, 
as Walras’ law (∑h Sh = 0). But every wage earner does respect her/his budget constraint, because (s)he 
can only spend what (s)he earned: Sb = Sd = 0. Therefore, Sa + Sc = 0: all capitalist balances offset each 
other, even if each capitalist does not necessarily respect her/his budget constraint, for (s)he spends 
before recording her/his deeply uncertain receipts.  
 
  This  “restricted  Walras’  law”
14  is  consistent  with  the  Kalecki-Kaldor  principle.  On  one  hand, 
“wage earners spend what they earn.” Every salaried employee i (= b,d) determines her/his consumption 
expenditures (C1i + C2i) depending on her/his wage (Wki). For b: W1b = C1d + C2b. For d: W2d = C1d + C2d. At 
the macro level, we have: W1b + W2d = C1b + C1d + C2b + C2d or W = C
w, with a trivial causality
15 from the 
revenue W to the consumption spending C
w. On the other hand, “capitalists earn what they spend.” 
Every capitalist j (= a,c) pays the employed labor and spends her/his expected revenue without knowing 
what the receipt (and what the profit) will be. For a: πa = Ra - W1b = C’1a + C1c + C1b + C1d - W1b. For c: πc = 
Rc - W2d = C2a + C’2c + C2b + C2d - W2d. At the macro level, we have: πa + πc = C’1a + C2a + C1c + C’2c + C
w - W = 
C’1a + C2a + C1c + C’2c = Ca + Cc or π = C
k [or also (πa - C’1a) + (πc - C’2c) = C2a + C1c], with a paradoxical 
causality from the consumption spending C
k to the revenue π.  
 
                                                            
14 See Cartelier [1995], pages 47 to 53.  
15 The causality is robust, but the equality (W = C
w) simply stems from the absence of savings in this atemporal model.  9 
 
  Analytically, in this model as in the former one, the “monetary postulate” grounds the objectivity 
of economic evaluations, the two dimensions of monetary accounting and monetary exchange being 
unchanged.  On  the  other  hand,  the  third  dimension  of  monetary  disequilibrium  is  modified,  as  the 
initiative ability operated by autonomous spendings is from now on reserved only to capitalists. As a 
result, monetary circulation is complexified, with a differenciation between primary or initiatory flows 
(W1b and W2d; C1c and C2a) and secondary or derived flows (C1b; C1d; C2b; C2d), in addition to reflexive flows 
(C’1a and C’2c).  
 
Through  the  structural  relation  of  monetary  dependence,  the  economic  society  turns 
heterogeneous and the economy turns capitalist: entrepreneurs become owners-managers and workers 
become wage earners or dependent workers.  
 10 
 
5- A monetary economy of capitalist production with accumulation (Model IV).  
 
This  monetary  economy  is  still  made  of  two  produced  goods.  Individuals  a  and  c  remain 
specialized entrepreneurs, respectively employing individuals b and d. But the two commodities are now 
structurally differenciated as an investment good (1 produced by a and b) and a consumption good (2 
produced by c and d)
16, which enables the introduction of a logic of accumulation.  
 
↗  a.  c.  b.  d.  ∑ 
a.  (i’1a ; 0 ; 0)  (i1c ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (q1a ; 0 ; 0) 
c.  (0 ; c2a ; 0)  (0 ; c’2c ; 0)  (0 ; c2b ; 0)  (0 ; c2d ; 0)  (0 ; q2c ; 0) 
b.  (0 ; 0 ; t1b)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; t1b) 
d.  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; t2d)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; 0)  (0 ; 0 ; t2d) 
∑  (i’1a ; c2a ; t1b)  (i1c ; c’2c ; t2d)  (0 ; c2b ; 0)  (0 ; c2d ; 0)  (q1 ; q2 ; t) 
Quasi-matrix of bilateral real flows of model IV: (investment good 1; consumption good 2; labor). 
 
 
↗  a.  c.  b.  d.  ∑ 
a.  [I’1a]  C2a  W1b  0  Da  
c.  I1c  [C’2c]  0  W2d  Dc  
b.  0  C2b  0  0  Db 
d.  0  C2d  0  0  Dd 
∑  Ra  Rc  Rb  Rd  Ω 
Matrix of bilateral monetary flows of model IV: in dollars. 
 
  The transition from the real volumes to monetary values is given by: Wkh = w0 tkh, I1h = p1* i2h and 
C2h = p2* c2h. The two market prices may obey different rules of formation, as illustrated in appendix 4. 
The social identity of material conservation, Walras’ law (∑h Sh = 0), the respect of the budget constraint 
by each wage earner (Sb = Sd = 0) and the offsetting of all capitalists balances (Sa + Sc = 0) still stand.  
 
  The Kalecki-Kaldor principle still prevails, with a simplified aspect for wage earners (just one 
consumption good remains) and a complexified aspect for capitalists (one investment good appears). On 
one hand, the employees’wages determine their consumption spendings. If wage earners don’t save, 
then W1b = C2b for b and W2d = C2d for d. At the macroeconomic level: W1b + W2d = C2b + C2d , or W = C
w. 
On the other hand, the employers’ investment and consumption spendings determine their profits. For 
a: πa = Ra – W1b = I’1a + I1c - W1b. For c: πc = Rc – W2d = C2a + C’2c + C
w - W2d. At the macroeconomic level: π = 
πa + πc = I’1a + I1c + C2a + C’2c + C
w - W = I’1a + I1c + C2a + C’2c = I + C
k, or also: (πa - I’1a) + (πc - C’2c) = I1c + C2a.  
 
  Analytically, the “monetary postulate” still grounds the objectivity of economic evaluations, with 
monetary  accounting  and  monetary  exchange (as  in  II  and  III)  and  with  monetary  disequilibrium 
stemming  from  the  capitalists’  autonomous  expenses  (as  in  III).  Monetary  circulation  is  even  more 
complexified by a dissymmetry of initiatory flows (W1b and W2d; I1c and C2a), of derived flows (C2b and C2d) 
and of reflexive flows (I’1a and C’2c). Capital accumulation renders the capitalist economy dynamic and 
supports the perpetual search for a bigger wealth by capitalist entrepreneurs.  
 
                                                            
16 As good 1 is bought by capitalists only and good 2 is bought by all agents, the symmetry between the two sectors is lost.  11 
 
6- Conclusion.  
 
  Money, market and capitalism. Following the prevailing doxa or according to the free market 
view,  a  capitalist  economy  and  a  market  economy  are  basically  the  same  thing.  Objections  to  this 
confusion go against strong prejudices, but also hit conceptual difficulties: a capitalist economy can’t be 
reduced to a market economy but contains market elements; a capitalist economy is based on a strong 
asymmetry but wage-earners are dependent without being totally heteronomous; a capitalist economy 
accomplishes a massive accumulation of commodities but its ultimate motive is not the satisfaction of 
needs, and so on… Yet, a monetary approach might enable one to properly distinguish a pure market 
economy and a capitalist economy.  
 
First,  both  pure  market  and  capitalist  economies  rest  on  the  nominal  basis  of  monetary 
quantification  through  the  unit  of  account  (a):  individuals  are  socialized  as  dollar  account  holders. 
Second, both economies rest on the principle of monetary mediation by the general equivalent (b): 
commodities are recognized as objects traded for dollars. Beyond sharing these two working general 
principles, the pure market economy and the capitalist economy differ in the structural distribution of 
monetary access (c) and in terms of individual motives (d).  
 
The  representation  of  a  pure  market  economy  requires  an  autonomous  spending  capability 
granted to all agents (c1), this universal monetary access expressing the homogeneity of the market 
society. Moreover, it is not necessary to introduce the desire for money to capture the specific features 
of the market society, since these features can simply be represented by the mathematizable principle of 
utility (operable by maximization) or by the anthropological principle of need (understood as the minimal 
search for subsistence or as the progressive will to better one’s condition).  
 
  The monetary representation of a capitalist economy substantially modifies the distribution of 
monetary  autonomy,  restricted  to  capitalists  (c2).  This  divide  between  independent  spenders  and 
dependent ones expresses the heterogeneity of the capitalist society. The introduction of unlimited 
desire for money is moreover necessary, as the subjective driving force of the process of accumulation 
(beyond the structural logic of capital and the competitive constraint pushing every capitalist to invest): 
the  frantic  and  indefinite  search  for  profit  and  for  its  increase  by  re-investment surpasses material 
interest and ultimately obeys the chrematistic passion
17 defining the capitalist spirit. Here instrumental 
money (“la monnaie”) is also sweet cash (“l’argent”), an object that stirs passion and emotion (d2).  
 
  So the monetary approach enables to assert that capitalism can’t be reduced to market, because 
of the wage relation (which determines workers as dependent agents) and because of the desire for 
money (which indefinitely fuels the pursuit of accumulation by capitalists). The open question is then the 
relation  between  these  two  elements,  which  belong  to  different  orders  (structural  economic 
organization and psychological economic profile) and which may seem independent. Indeed, the wage 
relation may be abstractly conceived without the desire for money, assuming that capitalists are not 
moved by the desire of accumulation but by the search for utility (or by the satisfaction of needs), as 
exemplified by our model III which displays a capitalist economy driven by utility and not by profit. 
Reversely, the desire for money may be conceived without the wage relation, under the specific form of 
pure speculation (commercial or financial). But this relative independence could be turned into a fruitful 
complementarity,  following  the  vision  of  a  “complete  capitalism”  combining  an  objective  capitalist 
structure and a subjective capitalist mentality.  
                                                            
17 See Berthoud [1992], especially pages 170 and 171.  12 
 
 
Such a perspective can be backed by some conceptual and methodological clarifications, about a 
general  framework  that  assumes  a  prior  objective  social  structure,  emphazises  the  operation  of 
intersubjective relations and recognizes the role of subjective impulses.  
 
  Objective structure, intersubjective relations and subjective impulses. When the jump is made 
from  a  real  economy  with  money  to  a  monetary economy  with  goods  and  services,  money  as  the 
common  unit  of  account  is  no  longer  a  neglected  monetary  function
18,  but  constitutes  the  crucial 
economic feature. As a unit of account, money is the basic economic objectivity: it institutes a common 
economic  language  that  is  meant  to  be  written  as  a  nominal  accounting.  So  economic  values  are 
quantitative because of their monetary expression and they are socially recognized thanks to the unit of 
their  measurement.  As  a  consequence,  economic  quantitativism  is  neither  disembodied  (as  in 
mathematics)  nor  natural  (as  in  physics):  it  is  socially  grounded  in  the  qualitative  framework  of  a 
constitution whose first article verbally creates a unit of account, a “nominal anchorage.”  
 
  This  fundamental  convention  is  the  keystone  of  an  objective  social  institution,  the  payment 
system,  which  settles  the  rules  of  money  creation,  circulation  and  destruction.  Through  circulation, 
money determines all object exchanged for it as a commodity, whose value is given by the payment 
operation: prices are basically absolute in a monetary economy (as they are fundamentally relative in a 
real economy). Economic agents are recognized in the social structure of accounting by the engaged 
expenses and by the received receipts (as they are recognized by detained allocations and preferences 
defined in the social structure of the commodity space in a real economy)
19.  
 
  An individual decides her/his spendings but merely records her/his receipts. So agents granted 
with the monetary power of spending before earning benefit from the extended liberty of independent 
agents. And agents subjected to the monetary necessity of earning before spending have to content 
themselves with the limited liberty of dependent agents. For every individual, the effective spendings 
become part of others’ receipts. But she/he does not control others’ spendings, which partly become 
her/his receipts; she/he can’t even perfectly foresee these others’ spendings, as they are decided by 
other (more or less) free individuals.  
 
A decentralized economy involves a plurality of free action takers: this of course means the 
absence of an economic dictator or a central planner. But this also entails the presence of a deep social 
opacity: a general endogenous uncertainty. As a consequence, the private evaluation of an individual or 
the evaluation she/he thinks she/he will be given by the others (expected receipts) and her/his effective 
social  evaluation  by  the  others  (effective  receipts)  are  likely  to  differ  and  mark  an  individual 
disequilibrium in decentralized economies such as pure market and capitalist economies.  
 
  Let’s bring together all these elements, calling “objective” what is the same for all and imposed 
on each; “subjective” what is proper to each and decided by each; and “intersubjective” what occurs 
between several individuals (from two to all). First we have the objective framework, the rules of the 
game: the institution of money and the monetary institution of a pure market economy (introducing the 
                                                            
18 In their book “Animal spirits,” Akerlof and Shiller [2009] notice, in a chapter dedicated to “Money illusion,” that the functions 
of money as a medium of exchange and as a store of value “have been analyzed to death by economists *…+. But economists 
have paid scant attention to the role of money as a unit of account. Its use as a unit of account means that people think in terms 
of money. It means that contracts are denominated in money terms. Likewise, accounting is denominated in nominal terms”.  
19 Choosing R
n as the commodity space is not purely mathematical or economically obvious: it institutes goods as the basic 
economic objectivity, which constitutes the first postulate of theories of value.  13 
 
market relation as a coordination feature) or of a capitalist economy (adding the wage relation as a 
subordination feature). Second we have subjective actions, essentially spending bids: situated in the 
objective  framework,  they  are  indeed  intersubjective  relations  initiated  by  an  individual  decision  (I 
decide to spend money you don’t choose to receive). Third we have the objective outcome, the result of 
the game: through a process of emergence or self-transcendence, a social statement comes from all 
intersubjective relations and comes back as an objective judgment for each individual (her/his monetary 
balance).  
 
  This epistemological development reveals an approach which could be called “soft structuralism” 
or  “relational  individualism”:  individuals  make  decisions  and  take  actions  in  a  socially  determined 
context,  which  means  from  a  defined  economic  position  (entrepreneur  or  wage-earner)  and  in  the 
network of economic relations (payments). Engaging and engaged by social relations, interdependent 
individuals are, at the same time and at different degrees, independent and dependent. Two versions of 
this approach may eventually be distinguished, considering what should or could be said about individual 
psychology.  
 
From a more formal and explanatory point of view, we should strictly focus our attention on the 
“hard” object of structuring and structured social relations
20, whose objectivity provides social science a 
solid ground, under the specific form of social and quantitative variables for economics. As conscious 
motivations  or  unconscious  forces  are  too  uncertain  or  too  “soft”  to  be  seriously  considered, 
psychological considerations should be ignored or minimized
21.  
 
From a more substantive and comprehensive point of view, we should first focus our attention 
on social relations but then turn towards individual driving forces. Individual action is always socially 
defined and even partly socially determined, but a social system can’t function and reproduce itself 
without some individual impetus. So it is legitimate to wonder if agents who are running a pure market 
economy are moved by the satisfaction of needs, the search for utility or the “propensity to truck, barter 
and  exchange  one  thing  for  another.”  And  it  is  also  relevant  to  wonder  why,  beyond  systemic 
constraints, capitalists engage themselves in the dynamics of accumulation. Which “animal spirit” is at 
stake  when  a  market  jump  is  made,  especially  when  a  deeply  uncertain  and  definitely  strategic 
investment decision is made: a Schumpeterian desire to keep busy and to undertake new projects, or a 
Freudian desire of money, which is the desire of always more money? In any case, if money should be 
first considered as an institution, it might or should then be envisioned as the reified and even fetishied 
object of strong economic passions, under the conservative form of miser preservation (for the rentier) 
or under the destructive-creative form of indefinite accumulation (for the capitalist). The rationality of 
the “demand for money” and of “profit maximization” may ultimately be the rationalization of individual 









                                                            
20 For an explicitly structuralist macroeconomic construction, see Taylor [2004].  
21 Such a point of view is defended by Benetti and Cartelier [1980].  14 
 
Appendix 1: Development of model I.  
 
1- Individual optimal choices.  
 
Given the price system P = (p1 ; p2), prices expressed in a conventional numéraire,  
each agent h (= a, b, c, d) maximizes her/his utility Uh under the budget constraint P . Zh = 0,  
where Zh is the vector of excess demands for h: zkh(P) = xhk(P) – xhk (k = 1,2).  
If Uh = x1h x2h, Za = Zb = (-0,5 ; 0,5(p1/p2)) and Zc = Zd = (0,5(p2/p1) ; -0,5).  
If Uh = x1h
1/2
 + x2h
1/2, Za = Zb = [-p1 / (p1+p2) ; p1
2
 / p2(p1+p2)] and Zc = Zd = [p2
2
 / p1(p1+p2)] ; -p2 / (p1+p2)]. 
 
2- Equilibrium prices and allocations.  
 
The general equilibrium of this economy is determined when (for instance) ∑h z1h(P
e) = 0.   
The economy being symmetrical, the general equilibrium is obtained when p1 = p2.  





e = (-0,5 ; 0,5) and Zc
e = Zd
e = (0,5 ; -0,5).  
The equilibrium allocations are:  
(c’1a
e ; c2a
e) = (x1a + z1a
e- ; z2a
e+) and same thing for b; (c1c
e ; c’2c
e) = (z1c
e+ ; x2c + z2c
e-) and same thing for d.  
The economy being symmetrical, the equilibrium allocations are identical: (c1h
e ; c2h
e) = (0,5 ; 0,5).  
 
3- Implementation of equilibrium exchanges.  
 
If equilibrium trade is centralized, everybody brings all the equilibrium supplies to the clearing house (or 
chambre de compensation) and then comes back to collect all the equilibrium demands.  
 
If equilibrium trade is decentralized, then we have to explain how a and b deliver good 1 to c and d and 
how c and d deliver good 2 to a and b. In the following quasi-matrix, bilateral trade coefficients λ, μ, ψ 
and ϕ (which are ≥ 0 and ≤ 1) have been introduced to describe who gets what from whom.  
 
↗  a.  b.  c.  d.  ∑ (ini. alloc. Xh) 
a.  (c’1a
e ; 0)  (0 ; 0)  ((1-ψ)c1c
e ; 0)  ((1-ϕ)c1d
e ; 0)  (1 ; 0)  
b.  (0 ; 0)   (c’1b
e ; 0)  (ψc1c
e ; 0)  (ϕc1d
e ; 0)  (1 ; 0) 
c.  (0 ; (1-λ)c2a
e)  (0 ; (1-μ)c2b
e)  (0 ; c’2c
e)   (0 ; 0)  (0 ; 1) 
d.  (0 ; λc2a
e)  (0 ; μc2b
e)  (0 ; 0)   (0 ; c’2d
e)  (0 ; 1) 









e)  (2 ; 2) 
Quasi-matrix of bilateral real flows of model I: (good 1 ; good 2). 
 
Does everybody get what (s)he is supposed to get? These “getting conditions” are obviously respected, 
for any possible value of the bilateral trade coefficients.  




e for a and 1 - c’1b
e = ψc1c
e + ϕc1d




e for c and 1 - c’2d
e = λc2a
e + μc2b
e for d. 




e) and likewise for c and d,  
then we must have ψ + ϕ = 1 and λ + μ = 1 for the “giving conditions” to be respected.  
So the general equilibrium barter could for instance be achieved by two separate bilateral matches, 
between a and c (λ = 0 and ψ = 0) and between b and d (μ = 1 and ϕ = 1). But as the general equilibrium 
approach features the notion of general interdependence, exchange is perhaps better accomplished by a 
global barter (easily obtained when λ = μ = ψ = ϕ = 1/2), so we select this scenario in the quasi-matrix 
initially given in the text.  15 
 
Appendix 2: Development of model II.  
 
1- Market projection and exchange engagement. 
 
Under  expected  monetary  prices  P  =  (p1 ;  p2),  each  agent  h  maximizes  her/his  utility  Uh  under  the 
expected budget constraint P . Zh = 0.  
When zkh < 0, agent h supplies good k and bring to market k a supply (in volume) okh = │zkh
-│ (real bid). 
When zkh > 0, agent h demands good k and expresses on market k a demand (in value) Mkh = pk zkh
+ =  
pk dkh (monetary bid), for which she/he requests a minting operation.  
If Uh = x1h x2h, Za = Zb = (-0,5 ; 0,5(p1/p2)) and Zc = Zd = (0,5(p2/p1) ; -0,5),  
so o1a = o1b = 0,5 and M2a = M2b = 0,5p1; o2c = o2d = 0,5 and M1c = M1d = 0,5p2.  
If Uh = x1h
1/2
 + x2h
1/2, Za = Zb = [-p1 / (p1+p2) ; p1
2
 / p2(p1+p2)] and Zc = Zd = [p2
2
 / p1(p1+p2)] ; -p2 / (p1+p2)],  
so o1a = o1b = p1 / (p1+p2) and M2a = M2b = p1
2
 / (p1+p2); o2c = o2d = p2 / (p1+p2) and M1c = M1d = p2
2
 / (p1+p2).  
 
2- Formation of market prices and market circulation.  
 
Under the “Cantillon-Smith rule” (Benetti and Cartelier [2001]), the price of a good is given by the ratio  
between the money brought to the market to be spent and the goods brought to the market to be sold,  
so we have p1* = (M1c+M1d) / (o1a+o1b) = p2 and p2* = (M2a+M2b) / (o2c+o2d) = p1. 
If Uh = x1h x2h, then p1* = p2 and p2* = p1. 
If Uh = x1h
1/2
 + x2h
1/2, then p1* = p2
2 / p1 and p2* = p1
2/ p2.  
 
With this specific rule of price formation, market sanction involves receipts and purchases  
but does not affect expenses and sales:  
- The volume of supply or expected sale (okh) equals the effective sale (vkh).  
- The value of demand or expected expenses (Mkh) equals the effective expenses (Akh).  
- Expected receipts (pk okh) differ from effective receipts (Vkh = pk* vkh = pk* okh) if pk ≠ pk*.     
- Expected purchase (dkh) differs from effective purchase (akh = Akh / pk* = (pk/pk*) dkh) if pk ≠ pk*.  
 
3- Market results: effective allocations and monetary balances.  
 
With the Cobb Douglas utility function, the real and the monetary positions are:  
(1-v1a ; a2a) = (0,5 ; 0,5) and Sa = V1a – A2a = 0,5 (p2 – p1) for a and idem for b.   
(a1c ; 1-v2c) = (0,5 ; 0,5) and Sc = V2c – A1c = 0,5 (p1 – p2) for c and idem for d.  
  
With the additive utility function, the real and the monetary positions are:  
(1-v1a ; a2a) = (p2 / (p1+p2) ; p2 / (p1+p2)) and Sa = V1a – A2a = p2 – p1 for a and idem for b.    
(a1c ; 1-v2c) = (p1 / (p1+p2) ; p1 / (p1+p2)) and Sc = V2c – A1c = p1 – p2 for c and idem for d.  
 
An equilibrium for this monetary economy corresponds to correct price expectations (pk = pk* for all k).  
Such self-fulfilling prices coincide with Walrasian prices (p1 = p2) and generate the Walrasian allocation 
with a nil monetary balance for every individual.  
 
A disequilibrium corresponds to incorrect price expectations (pk ≠ pk* for at least one k), which entail  
positive and negative monetary balances (which need to be settled).  
 
In any case, the emerging general allocation is feasible and the social monetary balance is nil.  
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Appendix 3: Development of model III.  
 
1- The entrepreneurs-consumers’ planning.  
The owners-managers notice the level of the exogenous monetary wage and take the expected prices of 
the commodities as given: (w0; p1; p2) = (wage; expected price of good 1 ; expected price of good 2).  
Optimizing program of a: Max Ua(c’1a; c2a) subject to the expected budget constraint, Ra = Da  
(or πa = p1q1a - w0 ʃ1a = p1c’1a + p2c2a), and to the technological constraint, q1a = f1a(ʃ1a).  
First order optimality conditions are: MUc’1a/MUc2a = (p1/p2) and MPʃ1a = (w0/p1).   
This way, c’1a, c2a, q1a, ʃ1a and πa, Ra, Da are determined as functions of (w0; p1; p2).  
For c, one can the same way determine c’2c, c1c, q2c, ʃ2c and πc, Rc, Dc as functions of (w0; p1; p2). 
This kind of utility maximization requires a maximization of the expected revenue:  
πj has to be maximized for Uj to be maximized.  
 
2- Purchase of labor and production.  
Labor demands are supposed to be satisfied, by b for a and by d for c:  
ʃ1a (labor demanded by a) = ʃ1a (labor bought by a) = t1b (labor sold by b).  
Likewise for employer c and her/his employee d: ʃ2c = ʃ2c = t2d.  
Production and wage payment follow:  
q1a = q1a and W1b = w0 t1b for enterprise 1; q2c = q2c and W2d = w0 t2d for enterprise 2. 
According to this view, there is not a genuine “labor market,” as the aggregate labor demand determines 
the level of employment, labor suppliers passively adjusting to the entrepreneurs’ wishes.  
 
3- Engagement of money to be spent and of goods to be sold on the markets.  
Every entrepreneur is a supplier on her/his market and a demander on the other market.  
Entrepreneur a offers o1a = q1a – c’1a on market 1 and bids M2a = p2c2a on market 2.  
Entrepreneur c offers o2c = q2c – c’2c on market 2 and bids M1c = p1c1c on market 1.  
For the wage earners, let’s denote by β and δ the fractions of their wages b and d respectively devoted 
to the purchase of good 1. These preference parameters appear as exogenous budget coefficients,  
but they could be endogenized through the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function.   
Wage earner b engages M1b = β W1b on market 1 and M2b = (1-β) W1b on market 2.  
Wage earner d engages M1d = δ W2d on market 1 and M2d = (1-δ) W2d on market 2.  
 
4- Formation of market prices following the Cantillon-Smith rule.  
p1 = [M1b + M1c + M1d] / [o1a] = M1 / o1 on the market of good 1.  
p2 = [M2a + M2b + M2d] / [o2c] = M2 / o2 on the market of good 2.  
 
5- Market results: emergence of effective outgoings-incomings and purchases-sales. 
We denote purchases by a, sales by v, expenses by A and receipts by V.  
For a: the sale v1a = o1a and the receipt V1a = p1 v1a; the spending A2a = M2a and the purchase a2a = A2a/p2.   
For c: the sale v2c = o2c and the receipt V2c = p2 v2c; the spending A1c = M1c and the purchase a1c = A1c/p1.  
For b: the expenses are A1b = M1b et A2b = M2b and the purchases are a1b = A1b/p1 et a2b = A2b/p2.  
For d: the expenses are A1d = M1d et A2d = M2d and the purchases are a1d = A1d/p1 et a2d = A2d/p2.  
 
6- Final allocations.  
Final bundle for a: (c’1a; c2a) = (q1a – v1a; a2a) = (q1a – o1a; M2a/p2) = (c’1a; (p2/p2) c2a).  
Final bundle for c: (c1c; c’2c) = (a1c; q2c – v2c) = (M1c/p1; q2c – o2c) = ((p1/p1) c1c; c’2c).  
Final bundle for b: (c1b; c2b) = (a1b; a2b) = (M1b/p1; M2b/p2) = (βW1b/p1; (1-β)W1b/p2).  
Final bundle for d: (c1d; c2d) = (a1d; a2d) = (M1d/p1; M2d/p2) = (δW2d/p1; (1-δ)W2d/p2).  17 
 
At the macro level, it can be verified that c’1a + (p1/p1) c1c + βW1b/p1 + δW2d/p1 = c’1a + o1a = q1a and that  
(p2/p2) c2a + c’2c + (1-β)W1b/p2 + (1-δ)W2d/p2 = c’2c + o2c = q2c: the final allocation is indeed feasible.  
 
7- Monetary balances.  
Monetary balance for a: Sa = V1a - A2a – W1b = (…) = *A1c + A1d] – [A2a + A2b].  
Monetary balance for c: Sc = V2c - A1c – W2d = (…) = [A2a + A2b] – [A1c + A1d].  
One entrepreneur’s monetary balance appears as the difference between the inflows and the outflows 
of her/his monetary zone: [A1c + A1d] is the monetary leak from c’s sphere to a’s one (purchase of 1 by c 
and d) and [A2a + A2b] is the monetary leak from a’s sphere to c’s one (purchase of 2 by a and b).  
Under the Cantillon-Smith rule, one entrepreneur’s balance only depends on the uncertainty of her/his 
receipts (effective / expected), because the effective expenses are equal to the expected ones.  
Monetary balance for b: Sb = W1b – A1b – A2b = W1b - β W1b - (1-β) W1b = 0.  
Monetary balance for d: Sd = W2d – A1d – A2d = W2d - δ W2d - (1-δ) W2d = 0.  
At the macro level, we verify that S = Sa + Sc + Sb + Sd = 0 (the total balance is nil):  
S = V1a – A2a – W1b + V2c – A1c – W2d + W1b – A1b – A2b + W2d – A1d – A2d = 
[V1a – A1c – A1b – A1d ] + [V2c – A2a – A2b – A2d ] = 0 + 0 = 0.  
As Sb = Sd = 0 (every wage earner’s balance is nil),  
we also verify that Sa + Sc = 0 (the entrepreneurs total balance is nil).   
 
As Sa = V1a - A2a – W1b = p1 o1a – (p2 c2a + W1b) = p1 o1a - p1 o1a = [p1 - p1] o1a (because Ra = Da)  
and Sc = V2c - A1c – W2d = p2 o2c – (p1 c1c + W2d) = p2 o2c - p2 o2c = [p2 - p2] o2c (because Rc = Dc),   
we have: S = [p1 - p1] o1a + [p2 - p2] o2c = 0 (Walras law).  
It follows that there are three possible situations for the markets:  
if p1 = p1 and p2 = p2 (Sa = 0 and Sc = 0), then equilibrium in 1 and equilibrium in 2.  
if p1 < p1 and p2 > p2 (Sa < 0 and Sc > 0), then overproduction in 1 and underproduction in 2.  
if p1 > p1 and p2 < p2 (Sa > 0 and Sc < 0), then underproduction in 1 and overproduction in 2.     
 
As a convention, the receipts (R) and the expenses (D) include the value of self-consumption,  
while the value of the sales (V) and the value of the purchases (A) don’t include it,  
which of course doesn’t change anything to the calculus of the balances:  
For a, Sa = Ra - Da = [V1a + p1c’1a] – [A2a + W1b + p1c’1a] = V1a - A2a – W1b. 
For c, Sc = Rc - Dc = [V2c + p2c’2c] – [A1c + W2d + p2c’2c] = V2c - A1c – W2d. 
 
8- Entrepreneurs’ profits.  
As πa = p1q1a - W1b and πa = p1q1a - W1b, a’s windfall result is: WRa = πa - πa = [p1 – p1] q1a.  
Likewise for c: WRc = πc - πc = [p2 – p2] q2c.  
In profits net of self-consumptions, the windfall results correspond to the monetary balances.  
 
9- State of equilibrium.  
If the price expectations are correct (p1 = p1 and p2 = p2), then Sa = Sc = 0 and WRa = WRc = 0 on the 
monetary side and (c’1a; c2a) = (c’1a; c2a) and (c1c; c’2c) = (c1c; c’2c) on the real side:  
so the targeted allocation is attained, with a balanced effective budget constraint, for any capitalist.  
 
NB: Identification of the notations used in the text and the ones used in this appendix:  
Volumes of consumption (c) correspond to the amounts of good purchases (a) and to the volumes of 
self-consumption (c’). Values of consumption (C) correspond to the levels of consumption expenses (A) 
and to the values of self-consumption (C’).  
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Appendix 4: Development of model IV.  
 
Let’s develop this model from the basis of the former one, highlighting the changes introduced. To 
emphasize the dissymmetry between consumption and investment, we keep the same rule of price 
formation for good 2 but turn to a different rule for good 1. Unlike the flexible Cantillon-Smith rule kept 
for the consumption good, we choose a fixed price rule for this investment good.  
 
1- The capitalists’ investment decisions.  
Considering the expected price p1 of the production good, the interest rate to come and more generally 
their expectations about the following periods, capitalists determine their level of investment: i’1a for a 
and i1c for c. Notice that if the current period carries a certain degree of uncertainty and entails some 
market jump and sanction, the uncertainty intrinsic to investment decisions is even greater, as it involves 
deeply uncertain variables: the evolution of profits and of the interest rate in the future periods.    
 
2- The capitalists’ production decisions.   
Given the exogenous  wage  w0  and the expected  price  p1  of  the  investment  good,  a  is  assumed to 
maximize πa = p1q1a - w0 ʃ1a under the technological constraint q1a = f1a(ʃ1a). The optimality condition 
equalizing MPʃ1a and (w0/p1) enables the determination of q1a, ʃ1a and πa as functions of w0 and p1. 
Capitalist a indeed produces q1a = q1a using labor brought by b (ʃ1a = ʃ1a = t1b) in exchange of a wage 
payment (W1b = w0 t1b).  
Likewise, c maximizes πc = p2q2c - w0 ʃ2c under q2c = f2c(ʃ2c), which gives q2c, ʃ2c and πc as functions of w0 and 
p2. Capitalist c produces q2c = q2c using labor brought by b (ʃ2c = ʃ2c = t2d) in exchange of a wage payment 
(W2d = w0 t2d).  
 
3- The consumption spending decisions.  
For  capitalists,  profits  are  supposed  to  cover  investment  and  consumption  spendings,  under  the 
simplifying  assumption  of  self-financing.  As  the  accumulation  process  prevails,  the  financing  of 
investment spendings comes first and consumption spendings are residual.  
For a, πa = p1i’1a + p2c2a = I’1a + C2a, which determines C2a as a residue: C2a = πa - I’1a (assumed to be > 0).  
For c, πc = p1i1c + p2c’2c = I1c + C’2c, which determines C’2c as a residue: C’2c = πc - I1c (assumed to be > 0).  
For wage earners, all the revenue is used to buy the consumption good:  
worker b engages M2b = W1b and worker d engages M2d = W2d on market 2.  
 
4- Market actions, market prices and market results.  
Capitalist a decides to self-invests i’1a and offers o1a = q1a – i’1a on market 1.  
On the other side of market 1, c demands i1c.   
The market price is p1 = p1 for the investment good. 
First case: if o1a = i1c (equilibrium), then i1c = i1c and i’1a = i’1a; and we also have I1c = I1c and I’1a = I’1a.  
Second case: if o1a > i1c (overproduction), then i1c = i1c and i’1a > i’1a (unsold good): i’1a = q1a - i1c. 
Third case: if o1a < i1c (underproduction), then i’1a = i’1a and i1c < i1c (unbought good): i1c = q1a – i’1a.  
In any case, we have i1c or a1c = Min[i1c; o1a] = v1a (the exchange being voluntary and efficient); and we can 
denote the exchanged quantity of good 1 in a neutral way (purchase and sale) by e1: e1 = Min[o1a; i1c].  
 
Capitalist c self-consumes c’2c = c’2c = C’2c / p2 and offers o2c = q2c – c’2c on market 2.  
On the other side of market 2, a bids M2a = C2a or p2c2a, b engages M2b = W1b and d engages M2d = W2d.  
The market price is p2 = [M2a + M2b + M2d] / [o2c] = M2 / o2 for the consumption good.  
For c: v2c = o2c and V2c = p2 v2c = p2 o2c.  
For a: A2a = M2a and a2a = M2a/p2. For b: A2b = M2b and a2b = M2b/p2. For d: A2d = M2d and a2d = M2d/p2.  19 
 
 
5- Final allocations.  
Final bundle for a: (i’1a; c2a) = (q1a - v1a; a2a) = (q1a - e1; A2a/p2) = (q1a - e1; M2a/p2) = (q1a - e1; (p2/p2) c2a).  
Final bundle for c: (i1c; c’2c) = (a1c; q2c - v2c) = (e1; q2c - o2c) = (e1; c’2c).  
Final bundle for b: (i1b; c2b) = (0; a2b) = (0; A2b/p2) = (0; M2b/p2) = (0; W1b/p2).  
Final bundle for d: (i1d; c2d) = (0; a2d) = (0; A2d/p2) = (0; M2d/p2) = (0; W2d/p2).  
At the macro level, it can be verified that q1a - e1 + e1 = q1a and that  
(p2/p2) c2a + c’2c + W1b/p2 + W2d/p2 = c’2c + v2c = q2c: the final allocation is indeed feasible.  
 
6- Monetary balances and windfall results.  
Monetary balance for a: Sa = V1a - A2a - W1b = [A1c] – [A2a + A2b].  
Monetary balance for c: Sc = V2c - A1c - W2d = [A2a + A2b] – [A1c].  
Monetary balance for b: Sb = W1b - A2b = 0.  
Monetary balance for d: Sd = W2d - A2d = 0.  
One verifies that S = Sa + Sc + Sb + Sd = 0 (because of the monetary general structure)  
and that Sa + Sc = 0 (because of the monetary capitalist structure).  
 
As Sa = Ra - Da - Ra + Da = p1v1a – p2c2a – W1b – p1o1a + p2c2a + W1b = p1 (v1a - o1a) – p2c2a + p2c2a = p1 (e1 - o1a) 
and Sc = Rc - Dc - Rc + Dc = p2c2a + p2c2b – p1i1c - p2o2c + p1i1c + W2d = p1 (i1c - e1) + o2c (p2 – p2),  
we have: S = p1 (i1c - o1a) + o2c (p2 - p2) = 0 (Walras’ law).  
It follows that there are three possible situations for the markets:  
if i1c = o1a and p2 = p2 (Sa = 0 and Sc = 0), then equilibrium in 1 and equilibrium in 2.  
if i1c < o1a and p2 > p2 (Sa < 0 and Sc > 0), then overproduction in 1 and underproduction in 2.     
if i1c > o1a and p2 < p2 (Sa = 0 and Sc = 0), then underproduction in 1 and overproduction in 2.  
 
WRa = πa - πa = p1 (i1a + e1) - W1b - p1 (i1a + o1a) + W1b = p1 (e1 - o1a).  
if o1a = i1c (equilibrium in 1), then e1 = o1a and WRa = 0.  
if o1a > i1c (overproduction in 1), then o1a > e1 and WRa < 0.   
if o1a < i1c (underproduction in 1), then e1 = o1a and WRa = 0.  
 
WRc = πc - πc = p2 q2c - W2d - p2 q2c + W2d = (p2 - p2) q2c.  
if p2 = p2 (equilibrium in 2), then WRc = 0. 
if p2 > p2 (underproduction in 2), then WRc > 0.     
if p2 < p2 (overproduction in 2 [so underproduction in 1]), then WRc < 0.  
 
The  “underproduction  in  1  and  overproduction  in  2”  case  deserves  clarification.  For  a,  the 
underproduction in 1 is indeed ineffective (Sa = 0 and WRa = 0) as (s)he sells the expected quantity at the 
expected price. For c, the overproduction in 2 makes the actual receipts smaller than the expected ones 
(so WRc < 0). On market 1, c wanted to spend p1i1c but actually spent only p1e1, and this unused amount 
of money compensates the missing receipts [p1 (i1c - e1) = o2c (p2 – p2)], so in the end Sc = 0.   
  
7- State of equilibrium.  
If o1a = i1c and p2 = p2, then Sa = Sc = 0 and WRa = WRc = 0 on the monetary side  
and (i’1a; c2a) = (i’1a; c2a) and (i1c; c’2c) = (i1c; c’2c) on the real side:  
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